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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Case No. 
13932 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
This is an action tw recover dtumjies ror personal in-
juries suffered when plaintiff was electrocuted while 
working on a construction site near energized, uninsu-
lated high tension wires belonging to defendant Flowell 
Electrical Association, Inc. A similar action brought by 
the Guardian ad Litem of one of plaintiff's co-workers 
is currently pending before this court. See Olsen t \ In-
dustrial Commission, et al., Case No. 1 3867. 
1 
DARWIN A. JENSEN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant;, \ 
vs. 
THE STATE OF UTAH by and through I 
its ROAD COMMISSION, THE STATE OF J 
UTAH by and through its STATE INSUR- I 
ANCE FUND, THE STATE OF UTAH b) f 
and through its INDUSTRIAL COMMIS-
SION, and FLOWELL ELECTRICAL AS- \ 
SOCIATION, INC., a Utah corporation, / 
Defendants and Respondents. 
THE STATE OF UTAii ; •  .,.:..,:.>..-.*,. | 
its ROAD COMMISSION, I 
7 /;/ia rait j r'lai:it//;. I 
COX CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, l 
I N C > Third Party Dtlendaut. ' 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Plaintiff appeals from an order of the Third Judi-
cial District Court, the Honorable Gordon R. Hall, Judge, 
granting defendant Flowell Electrical Association's mo-
tion for summary judgment and dismissing plaintiff's 
complaint against defendant Flowell Electrical Associa-
tion with prejudice and on the merits. (R. 78-79.) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff prays for the court to reverse the aforesaid 
summary judgment and remand the case for trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff was electrocuted on September 6, 1972, at 
the construction site of Interstate 15 near Meadow, Mil-
lard County, Utah. (R. 2.) On that date a crew employed 
by the general contractor, Cox Construction Company, 
was engaged in pouring the concrete deck for a south-
bound lane of a north-south highway overpass. (R. 2.) 
When a concrete pump designed to place the wet cement 
on the upper deck failed to operate properly, Brent Cox, 
the company's superintendent for concrete construction, 
ordered his crew to continue with the help of a 40 ton 
American crane positioned at the southern end of the 
overpass. (Cox Deposition at 24, 35-36.)1 Plaintiff was 
on the deck releasing cement from a bucket attached to 
the crane's 50 foot boom when the boom either touched 
or came into close proximity with live, uninsulated, high 
iThe Deposition of Brent Cox is part of the record in Olsen v. 
Industrial Commission, et ah, Case No. 13867, pending before the court. 
2 
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voltage transmission lines owned and operated by de-
fendant Flowell Electrical Association. (R. 2.) As a 
result of the contact with the overhead transmission lines, 
plaintiff was struck down by 14,400 volts of electrical 
current which passed from the wires, through the boom 
and bucket, and into his body. (R, 2; Robinson Deposi-
tion at 50.) Although the electrical shock was not fatal, 
plaintiff's injuries were so se\ere that he was required 
to undergo amputation o! both ham's and irms below 
the elbow together with extended medical and surgical 
treatment for burns ?.nd re h red n«n«* *^mi;ie- (R ?..) 
Three or four days before this needless tragedy, Brent 
Cox contacted FlowelT's manager, Ralph Robinson, and 
asked him to move the power lines out of his construc-
tion area. (Robinson Deposition at 1 6.) Robinson re-
fused but agreed to meet Cox at the construction site for 
a joint inspection of the area. (Robinson Deposition at 
17, 19-20.) While present at the site, Robinson became 
aware of the potentially dangerous situation existing 
there, but was concerned about interrupting service to 
customers on the line. (Robinson Deposition at 22.) He 
informed Cox ih a if :!v;ro were an* possible way to 
pour the concrete without cutting the power he would 
appreciate it. (Cox Deposition at 15.) (.ox informed 
Robinson that the crane might be required to complete 
the job, and Robinson agreed to cut the power if Cox 
would notify him beforehand. (Robinson Deposition at 
22-2j.) Cox i:hi:n LOUI Rohiasen c!-.-i-: he intended to 
P'MW in ;i da> or two. i Robinson Deposition at 46.) 
3 
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When the work in the danger area began, it soon 
became evident to Cox that the crane would have to 
be used to complete the southern portion of the deck. 
(Cox Deposition at 24-27.) He therefore left the work 
site and personally drove to Flowell's office in Fillmore 
to ask Robinson to cut off the power. (Cox Deposition 
at 24, 27.) When he arrived, however, he was unable 
to locate or contact anyone from Flowell either at its 
office or anywhere in town. (Cox Deposition at 32.) With 
a full crew standing by and loaded cement trucks wait-
ing, Cox then ordered the work to proceed. (Cox Deposi-
tion at 26, 36.) 
Following the electrocution of Darwin Jensen and 
Randy Olsen, the local sheriff became concerned that the 
live wires over the work site might fall and kill or in-
jure more persons. (Robinson Deposition at 49.) But 
although the electrocutions occurred in early afternoon, 
even the county sheriff with his knowledge, experience, 
and resources was unable to locate anyone from Flowell 
until 5:00 p.m. that night. (Robinson Deposition at 50.) 
The power was not cut for repair purposes until some-
time after 5:00 p.m. (Robinson Deposition at 50.) 
Plaintiff's complaint against Flowell is based in part 
upon Flowell's negligent failure to have someone avail-
able or to take steps that would have permitted the con-
tractor to contact its personnel in the event of need, par-
ticularly when Flowell had actual notice of the type of 
work involved, the approximate time it would be under-
taken, and the great danger which would exist if the 
power were not cut. Flowell should have known that 
4 
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the contractor might act unreasonably or negligently in 
the resulting pressure situation after being unable to 
contact a single representative from its office or plant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ISSUE OF DEFENDANTS NEGLIGENCE 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE 
TRIER OF FACT. 
Respondent alleged below that Toma v. Utah Power 
& Light Co., 12 Utah 2d 278, 365 P.2d 788 (1961) was 
conclusive of the issues presented in the instant case to 
the extent that the facts when considered in a light most 
favorable to plaintiff would not allow him to recover. 
(R. 63-64.) Appellant contends that such a result can 
only be reached by invoking an erroneous application 
of the foreseeability test on which Toma is based. 
In Toma, an action was filed against defendant util-
ity by the administratrix of the estate of a deceased con-
struction worker who was electrocuted on September 
6, 1956, under factual conditions similar to those in the 
instant case. The lower court granted defendant's mo-
tion for a directed verdict and refused to submit the case 
to the jury. Plaintiff's subsequent appeal raised two is-
sues both of which were discussed extensively by the 
court: 
1. Was the trial court correct in refusing to sub-
mit the issue of defendant's alleged negligence to 
the jury? 
2. Was the trial court correct in deciding that 
the sole proximate cause of the death of Fred R. 
5 
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Shook, Jr. was the negligence of certain employees 
of the Mountain States Construction Company? 12 
Utah 2d at 282, 365 P.2d at 791. 
In the Toma opinion, this court defined the defend-
ant power company's duty as follows: 
It is well known that one dealing with electric-
ity deals with a force of dangerous character and 
that there is a constant risk of injury to persons 
or property if not properly controlled. The care 
observed must be commensurate with and propor-
tionate to the danger. Therefore, the defendant 
company was obliged to meet a high standard 
of care, which was greater in some cases than an-
other depending on the exigency of the service 
rendered. This duty the defendant owed to Fred 
R. Shook, Jr. at the time of and before his death 
when and while he was employed in the vicinity 
of defendant's wires. Its duty to avoid accidents 
could have been discharged by doing one of the 
following: (1) insulating high tension wires in 
the construction zone or (2) raising these wires 
in the construction zone to a point of safety or 
(3) by using hot tops to cut off, turn off, or deaden 
its high tension wires during the time they knew 
that employees were required to work in the vi-
cinity of the wires, or take other equally effective 
means for prevention of injury. Obviously it 
would not be required to comply with all these 
requirements because any one which would re-
move the danger would be sufficient. We have 
stated in Stone v. Union Pa. Railroad the test of 
liability respecting consequences flowing from a 
particular act or failure to act. It was the duty 
of the defendant under existing conditions to ex-
ercise a high degree of care to maintain its wires 
in such condition and in such a way as to avoid 
accidents. A high degree of foresight is required 
6 
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because of the character and behavior of elec-
tricity. 12 Utah 2d at 282-83, 365 P.2d at 791-92 
(footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
The court next considered the issue of defendant's 
breach and concluded that although the power company 
must be notified of changed conditions before it can be 
held liable, 12 Utah 2d at 283, 365 P.2d at 792, the com-
pany nevertheless has "the obligation to keep themselves 
informed generally of changing conditions and circum-
stances." 12 Utah 2d at 284, 365 P.2d at 792 (emphasis 
added). 
In Toma, it was undisputed that two telephone num-
bers of defendant's offices were posted on the construc-
tion site to be used for making requests to turn off the 
power. 12 Utah 2d at 281, 365 P.2d at 790. Further-
more, the utility had previously complied with requests 
to install hot tops to de-energize the wires, to place a 
pole in a river bed to lift the wires, and to turn the power 
off. 12 Utah 2d at 280-81, 365 P.2d at 790. The ulti-
mate breach issue in Toma was whether the company 
had actually received notice to cut the power on the fatal 
day but nevertheless refused. 12 Utah 2d at 284-85, 365 
P.2d at 792-93. Resolution of this question, the court 
held, was for the jury. 12 Utah 2d at 285, 365 P.2d at 
793. 
When the prudent behavior of the power company's 
representatives in Toma is compared to the conduct of 
Flowell's representatives in the instant case, the contrast 
is striking. In the case at bar, for example, the facts in-
dicate that: 
7 
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1. Flowell's manager refused to move the power 
lines out of the danger area upon request. (Robinson De-
position at 17.) 
2. The high tension wires in the construction area 
were uninsulated. (Robinson Deposition at 54-55.) 
3. Hot tops or other mechanisms to deaden the wires 
were not installed. 
4. Flowell's manager did not warn Cox Construc-
tion of the danger. (Robinson Deposition at 39.) 
5. Flowell's manager did not instruct Cox regard-
ing safety precautions in the danger area. (Robinson De-
position at 52-53.) 
6. Flowell had no personnel available at its main 
office during reasonable working hours on the day of 
the tragedy even though it knew that the cement pouring 
operation was imminent. (Robinson Deposition at 46, 
50; Cox Deposition at 32.) 
7. Flowell left no notice posted at its office or 
otherwise to inform Cox where he could reach company 
personnel in case of need or emergency. 
8. Flowell's manager did not make his home tele-
phone number available to Brent Cox. (Cox Deposition 
at 25; Robinson Deposition at 43-44.) 
9. Flowell's personnel were so inaccessible on the 
day in question that not even the county sheriff could 
locate them until 5:00 p.m. that night. (Robinson Depo-
sition at 49-50.) 
8 
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Plaintiff submits that the trial court should have 
allowed the trier of fact to decide whether the conduct of 
Flowell's representatives as aforesaid, constituted a breach 
of its duty to keep itself informed of changing conditions 
and to exercise a high degree of care to maintain its 
wires in such a way as to avoid injury to construction 
workers. 
POINT II 
THE ISSUE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE 
TRIER OF FACT. 
As in Toma, the second issue on this appeal is 
whether the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of 
law that the sole proximate cause of plaintiff's injury 
was the negligence of his immediate employer. In Toma, 
the Utah Supreme Court relied heavily on a proximate 
cause analysis set out at length in Hillyard v. Utah By-
products Co., 1 Utah 2d 143, 263 P. 2d 287 (1953). In 
that case an action was brought to recover damages for 
the death of an automobile passenger who was killed 
when the automobile in which he was riding crashed into 
defendant's truck which was parked so that its rear end 
extended five feet onto the paved portion of the highway. 
In holding that the issue whether the automobile driver's 
negligence was the sole proximate cause of the injury 
should have been submitted to the jury, the court cited 
Professor Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 Harv. L. Rev* 
1225,1229 (1937) with approval: 
The earlier of the two wrongdoers, even though 
his wrong has merely set the stage on which 
the later wrongdoer acts to the plaintiff's injury, 
9 
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is in most jurisdictions no longer relieved from 
responsibility merely because the later act of the 
wrongdoer has been a means by which his own 
misconduct was made harmful. The test has come 
to be whether the later act, which realized the 
harmful potentialities of the situation created by 
the defendant, was itself foreseeable. 
The court also cited Eldredge, Culpable Intervention as 
Superseding Cause, 86 U. Pa. L. Rev. 121 (1937), and 
Section 447 of the Restatement of Torts (1934) for the 
proposition that foreseeability depends on whether, in 
retrospect, the intervening act does not appear to be 
"particularly unusual" or "highly extraordinary." Hill-
yard, 1 Utah 2d at 149, 263 P.2d at 291. See also Annot., 
69 A.L.R.2d 93 (I960) for a discussion of the foresee-
ability test in the context of the instant case. 
In applying the foregoing foreseeability test to the 
factual context where an automobile driver negligently 
crashes into a negligently parked truck, the court cited 
the Pennsylvania case of Kline v. Moyer, 325 Pa. 357, 
191 A. 43, 111 A.L.R. 406 (1937), as authority for the 
following distinction: 
In applying the test of foreseeability to situations 
where a negligently created pre-existing condition 
combines with a later act of negligence causing 
an injury, the courts have drawn a clear-cut dis-
tinction between two classes of cases. The first 
situation is where one has negligently created a 
dangerous condition [such as parking the truck] 
and a later actor observed, or circumstances are 
such that he could not fail to observe, but negli-
gently failed to avoid it. The second situation 
involves conduct of a later intervening actor who 
negligently failed to observe the dangerous con-
10 
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dition until it is too late to avoid it. In regard 
to the first situation it is held as a matter of law 
that the later intervening act does interrupt the 
natural sequence of events and cut off the legal 
effect of the negligence of the initial actor. This 
is based upon the reasoning that it is not reason-
ably to be foreseen nor expected that one who 
actually becomes cognizant of a dangerous condi-
tion in ample time to avert injury will fail to do 
so. On the other hand, with respect to the sec-
ond situation, where the second actor fails to see 
the danger in time to avoid it, it is held that a 
jury question exists, based on the rationale that 
it can reasonably be anticipated that circumstances 
may arise wherein others may not observe the dan-
gerous condition until too late to escape it. The 
distinction is basically one between a situation 
in which the second actor has sufficient time, 
after being charged with knowledge of the haz-
ard, to avoid it, and one in which the second 
actor negligently becomes confronted with an 
emergency situation. 1 Utah 2d at 151, 263 P.2d 
at 292 (footnotes omitted). 
As the foregoing language plainly indicates, the 
court in Hillyard was relying on a method of identifying 
"highly extraordinary'' or unforeseeable conduct which 
basically evaluates two related factors: awareness of dan-
ger and time to avoid it. Thus the liability of the orig-
inal actor is conditioned solely on whether the inter-
vening actor has sufficient time to avoid the harm after 
becoming aware of the danger. If the intervening actor 
has sufficient time to avoid the harm but nevertheless 
negligently fails to avoid it, the original actor is relieved 
of liability as a matter of law since such conduct is pre-
sumed to be "highly extraordinary" and therefore un-
11 
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foreseeable. But if the intervening actor has insufficient 
time to avoid the harm, the issue of superseding cause 
goes to the trier of fact. 
Appellant contends that although the Hillyard 
method of identifying "highly extraordinary" conduct 
may be adequate for determining foreseeability in cases 
where an automobile crashes into a parked truck, it is 
woefully inadequate in cases where a construction worker 
is electrocuted by inadvertent contact with energized high 
tension lines. In the auto cases, for example, it seems 
clear in retrospect that it is "highly extraordinary" for 
a driver to smash broadside into a parked truck when 
he has had sufficient time after becoming aware of the 
hazard to avoid it. See e.g., Anderson v. Parson Red-E-
Mix Paving Co., 24 Utah 2d 128, 467 P.2d 45 (1970); Vel-
asquez v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., Yl Utah 2d 379, 366 P.2d 
989 (1961); Nyman v. Cedar City, 12 Utah 2d 45, 361 P.2d 
1114 (1961); McMurdie v. Underwood, 9 Utah 2d 400, 
346 P.2d 711 (1959). In these cases the only relevant 
factors bearing on the "highly extraordinary" conduct 
of the driver are awareness and time. In the construc-
tion cases, however, awareness and time are only two 
of a myriad of relevant factors bearing on the question 
whether the intervening actor's negligence was "highly 
extraordinary" or unforeseeable. The instant case pro-
vides a solid example. 
In the case at bar,2 the record demonstrates that 
Flowell Electrical Association, Inc., was aware that the 
2These factors are also discussed in Olsen v. Industrial Commission, 
et al., Case No. 13867, Brief of Appellant at 8-13. 
12 
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overpass was going to be constructed in close proximity 
to its wires, and if the crane were utilized, it would 
have to operate close to or underneath the energized lines. 
(Robinson Deposition at 22-24, 41.) The company also 
knew that the boom would have to be extended, that 
workmen would be required to be near the crane to 
handle the cement bucket leading from the boom, and 
if the boom should inadvertently contact the uninsulated 
wires, 14,400 volts of electricity would be discharged 
through the boom and into any person in close proximity 
to the crane. (Robinson Deposition at 22-24, 41, 50.) 
Knowing these facts, Flowell still failed to maintain 
an agent at the construction site while the equipment 
was operating in the area of those wires. Further, it 
failed to kill the wires or make arrangements for by-
passing them until construction in that area had termi-
nated. Instead, it selected an alternate course of action 
whereby it would kill the wires only after being notified 
by the contractor that the boom was being used in the 
immediate area. (Robinson Deposition at 22-23.) Fi-
nally, after selecting this alternate course, which plaintiff 
submits was fraught with danger, Flowell compounded 
the hazard by failing to insure that it could be contacted 
and informed when the boom was being moved into the 
immediate area of the wires. 
Plaintiff submits that a reasonable, prudent person 
would have realized that this alternate course created an 
unreasonable risk of harm to persons working in prox-
imity to the wires. It is common knowledge that high-
way construction contractors are under a duty to per-
13 
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form within a specific time and are not able to delay 
their work without severe financial repercussions. This 
is particularly so in an area where weather plays an 
important part in determining when construction work 
may be done, so that contractors must take advantage of 
all available working hours. This pressure to keep crews 
working is compounded where, as here, the contractor 
is dealing with construction materials such as hardening 
cement which must be used within a fairly short time 
period. Finally, the facts demonstrate that on the date 
of the tragedy, the contractor utilized every reasonable 
means to contact Flowell's agent in order to have the 
power killed while the crane and boom were being used 
in close proximity to its wires. The contractor had no 
way of knowing whether Flowell's agents had absented 
themselves from their office or their homes for merely 
an hour or a day, or whether their absence would be 
substantially protracted. Due to this lack of knowledge, 
the contractor did not act unpredictably in deciding to 
proceed with the construction in spite of the possible 
dangers. 
Plaintiff submits that based on these additional rel-
evant factors, reasonable minds could differ whether a 
reasonable, prudent electric company should have antici-
pated such conduct. Plaintiff further submits that unless 
such additional factors are considered, a realistic, ade-
quate and fair determination of the foreseeability ques-
tion is impossible. As Chief Justice Wade observed in 
his dissent in Toma: 
Here, the facts are very different from the facts 
in the Hillyard case. The rule that a person who 
does a static negligent act cannot reasonably fore-
14 
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see that such act will be a contributing cause of 
an accident where the person who does the inter-
vening act knew of the static negligence is only 
applicable where the static negligence creates dan-
ger which is so obvious, and the likelihood that 
it will be avoided so clear, that the accident cannot 
be reasonably foreseen. This rule is only invoked 
under those circumstances and in applying it we 
must keep in mind that foreseeability is the stand-
ard test and that knowledge of the static negli-
gence by the intervening tortfeasor can make his 
negligence the sole proximate cause only where 
with such knowledge it is clear that the original 
actor could not reasonably foresee that such an 
accident might occur. 12 Utah 2d at 290, 365 
P.2d at 796 (emphasis added). 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that when all the facts 
bearing on the contractor's intervening conduct are eval-
uated, the likelihood that he would halt the concrete 
pouring operation indefinitely and thereby avoid the dan-
ger is far from clear as a matter of law. The issue of 
proximate cause, therefore, should have been submitted 
to the trier of fact. 
POINT III 
THE LAW OF LEGAL CAUSATION HAS 
CHANGED SINCE TOMA v. UTAH POWER 
& LIGHT CO. WAS DECIDED 
The Toma case was decided in 1961. Since that 
time the Restatement of Torts, Second, has been adopted 
by the American Law Institute, and plaintiff alleges that 
it is reasonable for the court to adopt the Restatement 
Second position as it accepted the earlier Restatement 
view at the time Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Co. was 
decided. 
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In Hillyard, the Utah Supreme Court cited the old 
Restatement and relied upon the foreseeability test as set 
forth in that authority and as stated by Professor El-
dredge. 1 Utah 2d at 149, 263 P.2d at 291. Since Hill-
yard and Toma, however, the Restatement of Torts, Sec-
ond, has rejected the narrow foreseeability test. Section 
435 of the Second Restatement now provides: 
(1) If the actor's conduct is a substantial factor 
in bringing about harm to another, the fact that 
the actor neither foresaw nor should have fore-
seen the extent of the harm or the manner in which 
it occurred does not prevent him from being liable. 
(2) The actor's conduct may be held not to be 
a legal cause of harm to another where after the 
event and looking back from the harm to the 
actor's negligent conduct, it appears to the court 
highly extraordinary that it should have brought 
about the harm. 
Whether the intervening actor's conduct is "highly extra-
ordinary" is determined by the following test: 
Where it appears to the court in retrospect that 
it is highly extraordinary that an intervening 
cause has come into operation, the court may de-
clare such a force to be a superseding cause. (See 
§442(b).) Analytically, the highly extraordinary 
nature of the result which has followed from the 
actor's conduct (with or without the aid of an 
intervening force) indicates that the hazard which 
brought about or assisted in bringing about that 
result was not among the hazards with respect to 
which the conduct was negligent. (See §§451 and 
468.) Strictly, the problem before the court is 
one of determining whether the duty imposed on 
the actor was designed to protect the one harmed 
from the risk of harm from the hazard in question. 
Restatement of Torts, Second §435, Comment c. 
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In light of the Second Restatement position, the is-
sue of whether Cox Construction Company's negligence 
was such as to absolve Flowell of any liability is best de-
termined in light of the new Section 442 B which provides: 
Where the negligent conduct of the actor [Flo-
well} creates or increases the risk of a particular 
harm and is a substantial factor in causing that 
harm, the fact that the harm is brought about 
through the intervention of another force [Cox 
Construction} does not relieve the actor [Flowell} 
of liability, except where the harm is intentionally 
caused by a third person and is not within the 
scope of the risk created by the actor's conduct. 
(Emphasis and brackets added.) 
Thus Flowell is not relieved of liability if found 
negligent, unless Cox Construction or the crane operator 
intended to electrocute plaintiff and this harm was not 
within the scope of the risk created by Flowell. It has 
not been asserted by any party, however, nor is there 
evidence that would support the contention that the 
boom of the crane was purposefully brought in contact 
with the high tension wires with intent to injure plaintiff. 
With respect to the second part of the requirement which 
would bar Flowell's negligence as a legal cause, i.e., that 
the harm to plaintiff was not within the scope of the 
risk created by Flowell, the following Restatement pro-
vision is relevant: 
It is enough that the act is a normal consequence 
of the situation created by the actor's negligence. 
If it is done by the person who is harmed and is 
unreasonable in the sense above stated, it may 
amount to contributory negligence which as such 
prevents him from recovering (see §467), but the 
actor's negligent conduct is nonetheless the legal 
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cause of the harm. If the act is done by a third 
person {in this case Cox Construction} its unrea-
sonable character may make htm as well as the 
actor whose negligence created the situation liable 
to the person harmed thereby. Restatement of 
Torts, Second §443, Comment a (emphasis and 
brackets added). 
Under the Second Restatement, therefore, instead of 
absolving Flowell of liability, any negligence on the part 
of Cox Construction could render it (unless a claim against 
Cox is barred by Workmen's Compensation), as well as 
Flowell, liable to the plaintiff. Referring to such an in-
tervening act such as that committed by Cox and whether 
it will constitute the superseding and sole legal cause, 
the Second Restatement authors have stated: 
In order that the reaction of human beings to 
the stimulus of a situation be normal it is not nec-
essary that the situation be such as to make it 
justifiable or reasonable. It may be normal for a 
human being to react to the stimulus of a situa-
tion by an act which, no matter how carefully done, 
may involve an unreasonable risk of harm to the 
person doing it or to others. Such an act, if done 
by the person suffering the harm, may be contrib-
utory fault which prevents him from recovering 
(see §467), or, if done by a third person, may sub-
ject him to liability to the person harmed. Re-
statement of Torts, Second §443, Comment c (em-
phasis added). 
In determining whether the intervening act of Cox 
is to be considered the superseding cause, Section 442 
of the Second Restatement sets forth certain factors to 
be considered by the trier of fact: 
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The following considerations are of importance in 
determining whether an intervening force is a 
superseding cause of harm to another: 
(a) the fact that its intervention brings harm 
different in kind from that which would otherwise 
have resulted from the actor's negligence; 
(b) the fact that its operation or the consequences 
thereof appear after the event to be extraordinary 
rather than normal in view of the circumstances 
existing at the time of its operation; 
(c) the fact that the intervening force is operating 
independently of any situation created by the 
actor's negligence, or, on the other hand, is or is 
not a normal result of such a situation; 
(d) the fact that the operation of the intervening 
force is due to a third person's act or to his failure 
to act; 
(e) the fact that the intervening force is due to 
an act of a third person which is wrongful toward 
the other and as such subjects the third person to 
liability to him; 
(f) the degree of culpability of a wrongful act 
of a third person which sets the intervening force 
in motion. 
Each of the above factors has not been established in 
favor of Flowell as a matter of law. Flowell's own manager 
admitted in his deposition that he knew that the work 
would be dangerous for the workmen if the power were 
not cut. (Robinson Deposition at 38.) He also admitted 
that the local sheriff had wanted to contact him on the day 
the incident happened due to the emergency presented by 
the damaged wire, but was unable to do so until 5:00 
p.m. (Robinson Deposition at 49-50.) He also stated that 
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he knew that work under the wires was imminent be-
cause he had wondered why he had not yet been con-
tacted to cut the power. (Robinson Deposition at 46.) 
Brent Cox said he estimated the height of the wires to be 
50 - 60 feet (Cox Deposition at 38) instead of the 27 or 
29 feet as stated by Robinson. (Robinson Deposition at 
54-55.) Cox also stated that he thought the crane was 
going no higher than halfway below the wires and above 
the deck. (Cox Deposition at 39.) Cox further testified 
that the cement may remain in the trucks from an hour to 
an hour and a half depending on the temperature before 
the trucks or the cement would be damaged. (Cox Depo-
sition at 54-55.) Under these circumstances, plaintiff asserts 
that at the very least he should be given opportunity to 
present his evidence before a decision can be made as a 
legal certainty that no jury question exists. 
Plaintiff asserts that the Restatement Second posi-
tion is and should be the law in Utah and that the trier of 
fact's consideration of the factors set forth above should de-
termine whether Flowell's negligence constitutes a legal 
cause of plaintiff's injury. 
CONCLUSION 
The issues of defendant's negligence and proximate 
causation should have been submitted to the trier of fact 
for the following reasons: 
1. Reasonable minds may differ whether defendant, 
Flowell Electrical Association, Inc., breached its duty to 
exercise a "high degree of care" to keep itself informed of 
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changing conditions and maintain its wires in such a way 
as to avoid harm to construction workers. 
2. Reasonable minds may differ whether the inter-
vention of Cox Construction was so "highly extraordinary" 
under the pressure situation involved as to constitute a 
superseding cause of plaintiff's harm. 
3. The court should broaden the test of foresee-
ability set forth in the Hillyard and Toma decisions to 
take into account other relevant factors besides awareness 
of danger and time to avoid it. 
4. The court should adopt Sections 435, 442 and 
443 of the Restatement of Torts, Second, as the law of 
legal causation properly governing this case. 
Plaintiff respectfully prays the court to reverse the 
summary judgment entered against him and to remand 
the case for trial on the merits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
W. Eugene Hansen 
G. Richard Hill 
HANSEN AND ORTON 
410 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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